Leibniz, Randomness and the Halting Probability by Chaitin, G. J.
ar
X
iv
:m
at
h/
04
06
05
5v
1 
 [m
ath
.H
O]
  3
 Ju
n 2
00
4
Leibniz, Randomness & the Halting
Probability
Gregory Chaitin, IBM Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights
Dedicated to Alan Turing on the 50th Anniversary of his Death
Turing’s remarkable 1936 paper On computable numbers, with an applica-
tion to the Entscheidungsproblem marks a dramatic turning point in modern
mathematics. On the one hand, the computer enters center stage as a major
mathematical concept. On the other hand, Turing establishes a link between
mathematics and physics by talking about what a machine can accomplish.
It is amazing how far these ideas have come in a comparatively short amount
of time; a small stream has turned into a major river.
I have recently completed a small book about some of these developments,
Meta Math! It is currently available as an e-book on my personal website,
and also from arxiv.org, and is scheduled to be published next year. Here I
will merely give a few highlights.
My story begins with Leibniz in 1686, the year before Newton published
his Principia. Due to a snow storm, Leibniz is forced to take a break in
his attempts to improve the water pumps for some important German silver
mines, and writes down an outline of some of his ideas, now known to us
as the Discours de me´taphysique. Leibniz then sends a summary of the ma-
jor points through a mutual friend to the famous fugitive French philosophe
Arnauld, who is so horrified at what he reads that Leibniz never sends him
nor anyone else the entire manuscript. It languishes among Leibniz’s volumi-
nous personal papers and is only discovered and published many years after
Leibniz’s death.
In sections V and VI of the Discours de me´taphysique, Leibniz discusses
the crucial question of how we can distinguish a world in which science applies
from one in which it does not. Imagine, he says, that someone has splattered
a piece of paper with ink spots determining in this manner a finite set of
points on the page. Nevertheless, Leibniz observes, there will always be a
mathematical equation that passes through this finite set of points. Indeed,
many good ways to do this are now known. For example, what is called
Lagrangian interpolation will do.
So the existence of a mathematical curve passing through a set of points
cannot enable us to distinguish between points that are chosen at random
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and those that obey some kind of a scientific law. How then can we tell the
difference? Well, says Leibniz, if the equation must be extremely complex
(“fort compose´e”) that is not a valid scientific law and the points are random
(“irre´gulier”).
Leibniz had a million other interests and earned a living as a consultant
to princes, and as far as I know after having this idea he never returned to
this subject. Indeed, he was always tossing out good ideas, but rarely, with
the notable exception of the infinitesimal calculus, had the time to develop
them in depth.
The next person to take up this subject, as far as I know, is Hermann
Weyl in his 1932 book The Open World, consisting of three lectures on meta-
physics that Weyl gave at Yale University. In fact, I discovered Leibniz’s
work on complexity and randomness by reading this little book by Weyl.
And Weyl points out that Leibniz’s way of distinguishing between points
that are random and those that follow a law by invoking the complexity of a
mathematical formula is unfortunately not too well defined, since it depends
on what primitive functions you are allowed to use in writing that formula
and therefore varies as a function of time.
Well, the field that I invented in 1965 and which I call algorithmic infor-
mation theory provides a possible solution for the problem noticed by Her-
mann Weyl. This theory defines a string of bits to be random, irreducible,
structureless, if it is algorithmically incompressible, that is to say, if the size
of the smallest computer program that produces that particular finite string
of bits as output is about the same size as the output it produces.
So we have added two ideas to Leibniz’s 1686 proposal. First, we measure
complexity in terms of bits of information, i.e., 0s and 1s. Second, instead of
mathematical equations, we use binary computer programs. Crucially, this
enables us to compare the complexity of a scientific theory (the computer
program) with the complexity of the data that it explains (the output of the
computer program).
As Leibniz observed, for any data there is always a complicated theory,
which is a computer program that is the same size as the data. But that
doesn’t count. It is only a real theory if there is compression, if the program is
much smaller than its output, both measured in 0/1 bits. And if there can be
no proper theory, then the bit string is algorithmically random or irreducible.
That’s how you define a random string in algorithmic information theory.
I should point out that Leibniz had the two key ideas that you need to get
this modern definition of randomness, he just never made the connection. For
Leibniz produced one of the first calculating machines, which he displayed
at the Royal Society in London, and he was also one of the first people to
appreciate base-two binary arithmetic and the fact that everything can be
represented using only 0s and 1s. So, as Martin Davis argues in his book The
Universal Computer: The Road from Leibniz to Turing, Leibniz was the first
computer scientist, and he was also the first information theorist. I am sure
that Leibniz would have instantly understood and appreciated the modern
definition of randomness.
I should mention that A. N. Kolmogorov also proposed this definition of
randomness. He and I did this independently in 1965. Kolmogorov was at
the end of his career, and I was a teenager at the beginning of my own career
as a mathematician. As far as I know, neither of us was aware of the Leibniz
Discours. Let me compare Kolmogorov’s work in this area with my own. I
think that there are two key points to note.
Firstly, Kolmogorov never realised as I did that our original definition of
randomness was incorrect. It was a good initial idea but it was technically
flawed. Nine years after he and I independently proposed this definition, I
realised that it was important for the computer programs that are used in the
theory to be what I call “self-delimiting”; without this it is not even possible
to define my Ω number that I’ll discuss below. And there are other important
changes that I had to make in the original definitions that Kolmogorov never
realised were necessary.
Secondly, Kolmogorov thought that the key application of these ideas
was to be to obtain a new, algorithmic version of probability theory. It’s
true, that can be done, but it’s not very interesting, it’s too systematic a
re-reading of standard probability theory. In fact, every statement that is
true with probability one, merely becomes a statement that must necessarily
be true, for sure, for what are defined to be the random infinite sequences of
bits. Kolmogorov never realised as I did that the really important application
of these ideas was the new light that they shed on Go¨del’s incompleteness
theorem and on Turing’s halting problem.
So let me tell you about that now, and I’m sure that Turing would have
loved these ideas if his premature death had not prevented him from learn-
ing about them. I’ll tell you how my Ω number, which is defined to be the
halting probability of a binary program whose bits are generated using in-
dependent tosses of a fair coin, shows that in a sense there is randomness in
pure mathematics.
Instead of looking at individual instances of Turing’s famous halting prob-
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lem, you just put all possible computer programs into a bag, shake it well,
pick out a program, and ask what is the probability that it will eventually
halt. That’s how you define the halting probability Ω, and for this to work
it’s important that the programs have to be self-delimiting. Otherwise the
halting probability diverges to infinity instead of being a real number be-
tween zero and one like all probabilities have to be. You’ll have to take my
word for this; I can’t explain this in detail here.
Anyway, once you do things properly you can define a halting probability
Ω between zero and one. The particular value of Ω that you get depends on
your choice of computer programming language, but its surprising properties
don’t depend on that choice.
And what is Ω’s most surprising property? It’s the fact that if you write Ω
in binary, the bits in its base-two expansion, the bits after the binary decimal
point, seem to have absolutely no mathematical structure. Even though Ω
has a simple mathematical definition, its individual bits seem completely
patternless. In fact, they are maximally unknowable, they have, so to speak,
maximum entropy. Even though they are precisely defined once you specify
the programming language, the individual bits are maximally unknowable,
maximally irreducible. They seem to be mathematical facts that are true for
no reason.
Why? Well, it is impossible to compress N bits of Ω into a computer
program that is substantially smaller than N bits in size (so that Ω satisfies
the definition of randomness of algorithmic information theory). But not
only does computation fail to compress Ω, reason fails as well. No formal
mathematical theory whose axioms have less than N bits of complexity can
enable us to determine N bits of Ω. In other words, essentially the only way
to be able to prove what the values of N bits of Ω are, is to assume what you
want to prove as an axiom, which of course is cheating and doesn’t really
count, because you are not using reasoning at all. However, in the case of Ω,
that is the best that you can ever do!
So this is an area in which mathematical truth has absolutely no structure,
no structure that we will ever be able to appreciate in detail, only statistically.
The best way of thinking about the bits of Ω is to say that each bit has
probability 1/2 of being zero and probability 1/2 of being one, even though
each bit is mathematically determined.
So that’s where Turing’s halting problem has led us, to the discovery of
pure randomness in a part of mathematics. I think that Turing and Leibniz
would be delighted at this remarkable turn of events.
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Now I’d like to make a few comments about what I see as the philosophical
implications of all of this. These are just my views, and they are quite
controversial. For example, even though a recent critical review of two of
my books in the Notices of the American Mathematical Society does not
claim that there are any technical mistakes in my work, the reviewer strongly
disagrees with my philosophical conclusions, and in fact he claims that my
work has no philosophical implications whatsoever. So these are just my
views, they are certainly not a community consensus, not at all.
My view is that Ω is a much more disagreeable instance of mathematical
incompleteness than the one found by Go¨del in 1931, and that it therefore
forces our hand philosophically. In what way? Well, in my opinion, in a
quasi-empirical direction, which is a phrase coined by Imre Lakatos when
he was doing philosophy in England after leaving Hungary in 1956. In my
opinion, Ω suggests that even though math and physics are different, perhaps
they are not as different as most people think.
What do I mean by this? (And whether Lakatos would agree or not, I
cannot say.) I think that physics enables us to compress our experimental
data, and math enables us to compress the results of our computations, into
scientific or mathematical theories as the case may be. And I think that
neither math nor science gives absolute certainty; that is an asymptotic limit
unobtainable by mortal beings. And in this connection I should mention
the book (actually two books) just published by Borwein and Bailey on
experimental math.
To put it bluntly, if the incompleteness phenomenon discovered by Go¨del
in 1931 is really serious—and I believe that Turing’s work and my own work
suggest that incompleteness is much more serious than people think—then
perhaps mathematics should be pursued somewhat more in the spirit of ex-
perimental science rather than always demanding proofs for everything. In
fact, that is what theoretical computer scientists are currently doing. Al-
though they may not want to admit it, and refer to P 6= NP as an unproved
hypothesis, that community is in fact behaving as if this were a new axiom,
the way that physicists would.
At any rate, that’s the way things seem to me. Perhaps by the time
we reach the centenary of Turing’s death this quasi-empirical view will have
made some headway, or perhaps instead these foreign ideas will be utterly
rejected by the immune system of the math community. For now they cer-
tainly are rejected. But the past fifty years have brought us many surprises,
and I expect that the next fifty years will too, a great many indeed.
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